Showing posts with label polarity. Show all posts
Showing posts with label polarity. Show all posts

Monday, March 5, 2012

What does focusing tell us about language design?

This post is largely based on some conversations I've had about Polarized Logic/Focusing/Call-By-Push-Value recently, especially with Neel Krishnaswami and Wes Filardo, though it was originally prompted by Manuel Simoni some time ago.

I think that one of the key observations of focusing/CBPV is that programs are dealing with two different things - data and computation - and that we tend to get the most tripped up when we confuse the two.

  • Data is classified by data types (a.k.a. positive types). Data is defined by how it is constructed, and the way you use data is by pattern-matching against it.
  • Computation is classified by computation types (a.k.a. negative types). Computations are defined their eliminations - that is, by how they respond to signals/messages/pokes/arguments.

There are two things I want to talk about, and they're both recursive types: call-by-push-value has positive recursive types (which have the feel of inductive types and/or algebras and/or what we're used to as datatypes in functional languages) and negative recursive types (which have the feel of recursive, lazy records and/or "codata" whatever that is and/or coalgebras and/or what William Cook calls objects). Both positive and negative recursive types are treated by Paul Blain Levy in his thesis (section 5.3.2) and in the Call-By-Push Value book (section 4.2.2).

In particular, I want to claim that Call-By-Push-Value and focusing suggest two fundamental features that should be, and generally aren't (at least simultaneously) in modern programming languages:

  1. Support for structured data with rich case analysis facilities (up to and beyond what are called views)
  2. Support for recursive records and negative recursive types.

Minor addition to "core Levy"

I'll be presenting with an imaginary extension to Bauer's Levy language in this post.1 I've mucked around Levy before, of course, and it would probably help to review that previous post before reading this one. I want to make one addition to Levy before we begin making big, interesting ones. The derived form that I want to add - e1 orelse e2 - is computation code with type F bool if e1 and e1 have type F bool as well. This is definable as syntactic sugar, where x is selected to not be free in e2:

   e1 to x in 
   if x then return true 
   else e2
One other aside - do remember that, at the cost of potential confusion, I modified Bauer's original Levy implementation to make force a prefix operator that binds more tightly than application - force g z y can be written with parentheses as (((force g) z) y).

Positive types, positive recursive types

The functional languages have the construction of positive types just about right: they're made up of sums and products. I used a special LLF-ish construction for datatypes in my exploration of Levy#, but the more traditional way of introducing datatypes is to say that they are recursive types μt.T(t). The recursive types we're used to thinking about are naturally interpreted as positive types, because they are data and are inspected by pattern matching.

There's a tendency in programming language design to shove positive recursive types together with labeled sum types to get a familiar datatype mechanism.2 I will go along with this tendency and merge labeled sums and recursive types, writing them as μt.[L1: T1(t), L2: T2(t), ..., Ln: Tn(t)].

Here are datatype definitions for trees of ints and lists of ints:

   type+ tree = 
   μtree. 
   [ Leaf: int, 
     Node: tree * tree ]

   type+ list = 
   μlist. 
   [ Nil, 
     Cons: int * list ]
Note from the definition of lists that we also allow types to have no arguments: it's possible to treat the definition of Nil as syntactic sugar for Nil: unit. The associated value is Nil, which is syntactic sugar for Nil ().

There are infinitely many trees and lists as we've defined them. In fact, it's just a convention of how we have to write programs that we think of positive types as being finite sums. Even though we can't write it down as a datatype declaration, it's perfectly reasonable to think of a built-in type of infinite precision integers as being defined as follows:

   type+ int = 
   μint. 
   [ 0, 
     1,
     ~1,
     2,
     ~2,
     3,
     ... ]
The same goes for built-in strings and the like - think of built-in types being positive enumerations that were provided specially by the language since the language didn't give us the ability to write down the full declaration containing all possible constants.

Powerful views

A point that has not, in my humble opinion, been made simply enough is that the perspective of focusing says that we should think about integrating much more powerful case analysis mechanisms into our programming languages. I learned about this point from Licata, Zeilberger, and Harper's 2008 Focusing on Binding and Computation, but their setting had enough other interesting stuff going on that it probably obscured this simple point.

Standard ML (and, to the best of my knowledge, all other functional languages circa-1997) only provides a limited form of case analysis - arbitrary finite views into the outermost structure of the datatype:

   case x of
    | Leaf 9 => ...
    | Leaf y => ...
    | Node (Node (Leaf 5, y), z) => ...
    | Node (y, z) => ...
This limitation comes with a nice tradeoff, in that we can pretty effectively estimate how much work compiled code needs to do to handle a pattern match. However, the structure of focusing suggests that any mathematical function from a value's structure to computation is fair game. One well-studied modernization of pattern matching is views, which allows us to group computations in other ways. One use case would be allowing us to take an integer variable x and say that it is even or odd:
   case x of
    | 0 => return true
    | x is even => return false
    | ~1 => return false
    | x is odd => return true
The focusing-aware view of pattern matching suggests that what a pattern match is actually doing is defining a case individually for each value structure - if we could write a countably-infinite-sized program, then we could expand the view-based program above to the no-longer-view-based, but infinitely long, program below:
   case x of
    | 0 => return true
    | 1 => return true
    | ~1 => return false
    | 2 => return false
    | ~2 => return false
    | 3 => return true
    | ...
So: the focusing perspective says that any effect-free (effects include nontermination!) mathematical function we can write from value structure to computations is fair game for case analysis; views are just one known way of doing this in an interesting way. In principle, however, we can consider much richer case-analysis machinery to be fair game. For instance, there is a mathematical function \(f\) from integer values int to computation code of type F bool with the variable coll free:
  • If the integer is 1, the result is return true
  • If the integer is less than 1, the result is return false
  • Otherwise, if the integer is divisible by 2 and the result of dividing the integer by 2 is i, then the result is force coll i
  • Otherwise, let j be 3 times the integer, plus one. Then the result is force coll j
Given this mathematical function, we have the core case analysis at the heart of the Collatz function. If we expand out this case analysis into an infinitely-long mapping as before, it would look like this:
   rec coll: int -> F bool is
     fn x: int =>
       case x of
        | 0 => return false
        | 1 => return true
        | ~1 => return false
        | 2 => force coll 1
        | ~2 => return false
        | 3 => force coll 10
        | ~3 => return false
        | 4 => force coll 2
        | ~4 => return false
        | 5 => force coll 16
        | ...
The important question here is: what is the right way to think about how we write down total functions from value structures? Are views about right, or do we need something different, clearer/more/less powerful? I don't have a sense for the answers, but I'm pretty confident that's the right question.

Views are only over the structure of values

One critical caveat: I used the phrase value structure in the previous discussion repeatedly on purpose. Because computations can always contain effects, we cannot poke at the computations at all when we think about views - the value structure is just the part of the value that we can inspect without traversing a thunk. Therefore, if we have this definition...

   type+ somefn = 
   μsomefn. 
   [ BoolFn: U (bool -> F bool), 
     IntFn: U (int -> F int) ]
...then a case analysis on a value of type somefn can have at most two branches - one for the BoolFn case and one for the IntFn case. We can't pattern-match into computations, so even though it would be reasonable to say that there are many, many values of type somefn, there are only two value structures that can be inspected by case analysis.

Negative types, negative recursive types

In call-by-push-value, the computation types (a.k.a. the negative types of polarized logic/focusing) are defined by the way we use them. Computation code of computation type does stuff in response to being used - a function does stuff in response to getting an argument, and so the most well-understood negative type is implication.

Conjunction (the product or pair type) is a bit slippery, says the CBPV/focusing methodology. We've already used conjunction as a positive type (t1 * t2), but we can also think of conjunction as being a negative type. This is because it's equally valid to think of a pair being positively defined by its construction (give me two values, that's a pair) and negatively as a suspended computation that awaits you asking it for its first or second component.

CPBV/focusing makes us choose: we can have either type of conjunction, or we can have both of them, but they are different. It will be convenient if we keep the normal tuples as positive types, and associate negative types with records - that is, with named products. Records are defined by how you project from them, and just as we tie labeled sums in with positive recursive types, we'll tie labeled products in with negative recursive types.

Negative recursive types are naturally codata in the same way that positive recursive types are naturally data: the canonical example is the infinite stream.

   type- stream = 
   μstream. 
   { head: F int, 
     tail: stream }
It's natural to define particular streams with fixedpoints:
   val Ones = thunk rec this: stream is
   { head = return 1, 
     tail = force this }

   val CountUp = thunk rec this: int -> stream is
   fn x: int =>
   { head = return x, 
     tail = 
       force plus x 1 to y in
       force this y }
Say I wanted to get the fourth element of an infinite stream str of type U stream. The ML-ish way of projecting from records would write this as #tail (#head (#head (#head (force str)))), but I will pointedly not use that notation in favor of a different record notation: (force str).head.head.head.tail. It nests better, and works better in the case that record elements are functions. (Because functions are negative types, like records, it is very natural to have functions be the arguments to records.)

Negative recursive types as Cook's objects

Here's a bit of a case study to conclude. The entities that William Cook names "Objects" in his paper On Understanding Data Abstraction, Revisited are recognizably negative recursive types in the sense above.3 Cook's examples can be coded in Standard ML (see here), but the language gets in the way of this encoding in a number of places.4 To see what this would look like in a language with better support, I'll encode the examples from Cook's paper in my imaginary CBPV implementation. The recursive negative type looks much like a stream, and encodes the interface for these set objects.

   type- iset = 
   μiset. 
   { isEmpty: F bool, 
     contains: int -> F bool, 
     insert: int -> iset, 
     union: U iset -> iset }
One difficulty: the Insert and Union operations that Cook uses involve mutual recursion. I don't have mutual recursion, so rather than pretending to have it (I've abused my imaginary language extension enough already) I'll code it up using records. The record type insertunion I define isn't actually recursive, it's just a record - this is analogous to using ML's datatype mechanism (which, as we've discussed, makes positive recursive types) to define a simple enumeration.
   type- insertunion = 
   μinsertunion.
   { Insert: U iset * int -> iset,
     Union: U iset * U iset -> iset }

   val InsertUnion = thunk
     rec x: insertunion is
     { Insert = fn (s, n) =>
       (force s).contains n to b in
       if b then force s else 
       rec self: iset is
       { isEmpty = return false,
         contains = fn i => (force equal i n) orelse (force s).contains i,
         insert = fn i => (force x).Insert (self, i),
         union = fn s' => (force x).Union (self, s') },

       Union = fn (s1, s2) => 
       rec self: iset is
       { isEmpty = (force s1).isEmpty orelse (force s2).isEmpty,
         contains = fn i => (force s1).contains i orelse (force s2).contains i,
         insert = fn i => (force x).Insert (self, i),
         union = fn s' => (force x).Union (self, s') } }

   val Insert: U (U iset * int -> iset) = thunk ((force InsertUnion).Insert)

   val Union: U (U iset * U iset -> iset) = thunk ((force InsertUnion).Union)
We've defined union of sets and insertion into a set, but we haven't actually defined any sets yet! Once we give the implementation of an empty set, however, we can manipulate these sets with a Java-esque method invocation style:
   val Empty = thunk rec self: iset is
   { isEmpty = return true,
     contains = fn x => return false,
     insert = fn i => force Insert (self, i),
     union = fn s' => force s' }

   val JustOne = thunk (force Empty).insert 1
   (force Empty).insert(3).union(JustOne).insert(5).contains(4)
As Cook noted, it's also very natural to talk about infinite sets in this style, such as the set of all even numbers and the set of all integers:
   val Evens = thunk rec self: iset is 
   { isEmpty = return false,
     contains = fn i => 
       force mod i 2 to x in
       (case x of 
         | 0 => return true
         | _ => return false),
     insert = fn i => force Insert (self, i),
     union = fn s' => force Union (self, s') }

   val Full = thunk rec self: iset is
   { isEmpty = return false,
     contains = fn i => return true,
     insert = fn i => force self,
     union = fn s' => force self }


1 If anyone is interested in helping me implement a toy language along these lines, I'm all ears. Also, the disclaimer that since I don't have an implementation there are surely bugs bugs bugs everywhere is strongly in effect.

2 As a practical matter, this makes it easier for the language to know where to put implicit roll/unroll annotations, so that programmers doesn't have to write these explicitly, which would be a pain.

3 Cook does give the disclaimer that this definition is "recognized as valid by experts in the field, although there certainly are other valid models." I carefully call these things "Cook objects" rather than "objects" - my claim is that negative recursive types correspond to what William Cook names objects, not that they correspond to what you call objects. Note, furthermore, that I could be wrong about what William Cook calls objects! I only have his paper to go on and I have been known to be a few cookies short of a haystack.

4 There are two issues with the encoding in SML. The most basic is that we have to encode the recursive types using SML's recursive type mechanism, which is biased towards the positive encoding of recursive types as finite sums. The other issue is that the way SML ties together (mutual) recursion with closures gets in the way - the standard way of writing a "thunk" as a function from unit is all over the place, and it wan't possible to define EmptySet so that it was mutually recursive with the definition of Insert and Union as a result. So, I'm certainly not arguing that SML facilities programming in (what Cook calls) an object-oriented style in a strong sense - it's unnecessarily painful to code in that style - but the minimal semantic building blocks of what Cook presented and named Object are present and accounted for. [Update:] As gasche discusses in the comments, Ocaml's records, and the way it deals with laziness, make it quite a bit better at encoding the example, but it's still not ideal.

Saturday, December 17, 2011

Notes on classical sequent calculi (1/2)

These are some notes I made to try to help me understand Noam's focused presentation of classical logic in Polarity and the Logic of Delimited Continuations. I hope these notes coud be useful to others.

Sequent presentations of classical logic

I write, inevitably, from the perspective of an intuitionistic proof theorist, so let's start there. In intuitionistic logics, sequents have the form \(\Gamma \vdash A~\mathit{true}\), where the hypothetical context \(\Gamma\) has the form \(A_1~\mathit{true}, \ldots, A_n~\mathit{true}\). The whole sequent \(\Gamma \vdash A~\mathit{true}\) is read as "assuming the truth of all the things in \(\Gamma\), we know \(A~\mathit{true}\)." Let's look at a couple of ways of presenting sequent calculi for classical logic.

Two-sided judgmental classical sequent calculi

One way of presenting a classical sequent calculus is to give a two-sided sequent, \(\Gamma \vdash \Delta\). As before, \(\Gamma\) has the form \(A_1~\mathit{true}, \ldots, A_n~\mathit{true}\), but \(\Delta\) has the form \(B_1~\mathit{false}, \ldots, A_m~\mathit{false}\), and the whole sequent is read as "taken together, if all the things judged true in \(\Gamma\) are true and all the things judged false in \(\Delta\) are false, then there is a contradiction."

The language of propositions is \(A ::= P \mid \neg A \mid A \wedge B \mid A \vee B\) - uninterpreted atomic propositions \(P\), negation, conjunction ("and"), and disjunction ("or"). I'm leaving out truth \(\top\) and falsehood \(\bot\) because they're boring. The rules for these two-sided classical sequent calculi look like this:

\[ \infer {\Gamma, ~ P~\mathit{true} \vdash \Delta, ~ P~\mathit{false}} {} \] \[ \infer {\Gamma \vdash \Delta, ~ \neg A~\mathit{false}} {\Gamma, ~ A~\mathit{true} \vdash \Delta} \qquad \infer {\Gamma, ~ \neg A~\mathit{true} \vdash \Delta} {\Gamma \vdash \Delta, ~ A~\mathit{false}} \] \[ \infer {\Gamma \vdash \Delta, ~ A \wedge B~\mathit{false}} {\Gamma \vdash \Delta, ~ A~\mathit{false} &\Gamma \vdash \Delta, ~ B~\mathit{false}} \qquad \infer {\Gamma, ~ A \wedge B~\mathit{true} \vdash \Delta} {\Gamma, ~ A~\mathit{true}, ~ B~\mathit{true} \vdash \Delta} \] \[ \infer {\Gamma \vdash \Delta, ~ A \vee B~\mathit{false}} {\Gamma \vdash \Delta, ~ A~\mathit{false}, ~ B~\mathit{false}} \qquad \infer {\Gamma, ~ A \vee B~\mathit{true} \vdash \Delta} {\Gamma, ~ A~\mathit{true} \vdash \Delta &\Gamma, ~ B~\mathit{true} \vdash \Delta} \]

Two asides. First, in presentations that do not emphasize the fact that \(A_i~\mathit{false}\) and \(B_j~\mathit{true}\) are judgments and not propositions, there is another reading of the two-sided sequent \[A_1,\ldots,A_n \vdash B_1,\ldots,B_m\] This interpretation is that the truth of all of the \(A_i\) implies the truth of one of the \(B_j\) - this reading suggests a reading of any intuitionistic sequent proof as a classical sequent proof with one conclusion. You should convince yourself that this interpretation is equivalent to the interpretation above (hint: it's just a mode of use of De Morgan's laws).

Second aside: your rules may differ. I'm using a style of presentation where every connective is broken down by a unique connective and, from the perspective of bottom-up proof search, it's never a mistake to apply any rule, because the conclusion implies all of the premises (a property called invertibility). The "true" (or left) rule for conjunction (that is, "and" or \(\wedge\)) and the "false" (or right) rule for disjunction (that is, "or" or \(\vee\)) both have a different, non-invertible presentation. In the case of conjunction, it's this pair of rules: \[ \infer {\Gamma, ~ A \wedge B~\mathit{true} \vdash \Delta} {\Gamma, ~ A~\mathit{true} \vdash \Delta} \qquad \infer {\Gamma, ~ A \wedge B~\mathit{true} \vdash \Delta} {\Gamma, ~ B~\mathit{true} \vdash \Delta} \] You could "make a mistake" applying these rules in bottom-up proof search: just because there is a proof of \(\Gamma, ~ A \wedge B~\mathit{true} \vdash \Delta\) does not mean that there is a proof of \(\Gamma, ~ A~\mathit{true} \vdash \Delta\).

One-sided judgmental sequent sequent calculi

Of course, hypotheses are just hypotheses, there's no a priori reason why we need to separate the true ones and the false ones into separate contexts. Let's use a unified context and call it \(\Psi\). \[\Psi ::= \cdot \mid \Psi, A~\mathit{true} \mid \Psi, A~\mathit{false}\] Then, we can have the sequent form \(\Psi \vdash \#\), which we read as "all the assumptions in \(\Psi\) together imply a contradiction" - we pronounce \(\#\) as "contradiction." We'll need rewrite all of our rules:

\[ \infer {\Psi, ~ P~\mathit{true}, ~ P~\mathit{false} \vdash \#} {} \] \[ \infer {\Psi, ~ \neg A~\mathit{false} \vdash \#} {\Psi, ~ A~\mathit{true} \vdash \#} \qquad \infer {\Psi, ~ \neg A~\mathit{true} \vdash \#} {\Psi, ~ A~\mathit{false} \vdash \#} \] \[ \infer {\Psi, ~ A \wedge B~\mathit{false} \vdash \#} {\Psi, ~ A~\mathit{false} \vdash \# &\Psi, ~ B~\mathit{false} \vdash \#} \qquad \infer {\Psi, ~ A \wedge B~\mathit{true} \vdash \#} {\Psi, ~ A~\mathit{true}, ~ B~\mathit{true} \vdash \#} \] \[ \infer {\Psi, ~ A \vee B~\mathit{false} \vdash \#} {\Psi, ~ A~\mathit{false}, ~ B~\mathit{false} \vdash \#} \qquad \infer {\Psi, ~ A \vee B~\mathit{true} \vdash \#} {\Psi, ~ A~\mathit{true} \vdash \# &\Psi, ~ B~\mathit{true} \vdash \#} \]

Hopefully you'll agree that this is "obviously the same" as the first presentation.

One-sided, truth-oriented sequent calculi

But wait! The "false" rule for conjunction looks just like the "true" rule for disjunction, and the "true" rule for conjunction looks just like the "false" rules for disjunction. Can we simplify these rules?

The usual answer is that you can, indeed, do with fewer rules and without a false judgment at all. However, we need two twists to deal with the rules that involved both the true and false judgments. First, we need to let every atomic proposition come in two flavors, the "regular" flavor \(P\) and the "negated" flavor \(\overline{P}\). Then, the rule dealing with atomic propositions looks like this: \[ \infer {\Gamma, ~ P~\mathit{true}, ~ \overline{P}~\mathit{true} \vdash \#} {} \] Second, instead of negation being a proposition \(\neg A\), we define a negation function, which I will write as \((A)^\bot\) to distinguish it from the propositional negation \(\neg A\). W. The negation function is defined as follows: \[ \begin{align} {(P)^\bot} = & \overline{P}\\ {(\overline{P})^\bot} = & P\\ {(A \wedge B)^\bot} = & {(A)^\bot} \vee {(B)^\bot}\\ {(A \vee B)^\bot} = & {(A)^\bot} \wedge {(B)^\bot}\\ \end{align} \] With this definition, we can eliminate the negation proposition altogether - the negation function just applies De Morgan laws all the way down to atomic propositions. We now get our sequent calculus for "half off" - there's no more official negation, and we don't need the false judgment at all anymore. We only need two more rules (for a total of three)!

\[ \infer {\Psi, ~ A \wedge B~\mathit{true} \vdash \#} {\Psi, ~ A~\mathit{true}, ~ B~\mathit{true} \vdash \#} \qquad \infer {\Psi, ~ A \vee B~\mathit{true} \vdash \#} {\Psi, ~ A~\mathit{true} \vdash \# &\Psi, ~ B~\mathit{true} \vdash \#} \]

It would also be possible to play this game the other way around: gather everything on the right-hand side, bias the whole thing towards the "false" judgment, and basically get the "other half" of the two-sided sequent calculi. This ability to play the game equally well either way is part of what people mean when they say that classical logic is "very symmetric."

However, given that it's all the same, why not reason about truth and not falsehood? I've never understand why classical linear logic (in particular) always seems to bias itself towards one-sided sequent calculi on the right. There are important differences in what it means to think like a classical linear logician and what it means to think like an intuitionistic linear logician, but I really think that it unnecessarily exacerbates this divide when we have to turn all of our \(\oplus\)es to \(\&\)s and \(\otimes\)es to pars in order to talk to one another.

Polarized presentations of classical logic

Now for the real purpose of this note: writing out the review of classical logic that Noam gives in "Polarity and the Logic of Delimited Continuations." This discussion is a synthesis of that presentation and a little bit of "On the unity of duality."

Two for the price of two

Fundamentally, the observation Noam is making is that the one-sided truth-oriented sequent calculus goes too far - really, there are two kinds of disjunction, and two kinds of conjunction, which is why it seemed like the original calculus seemed to have redundancies. The third system above (the one-sided, truth-oriented sequent calculus) made it look like we were getting our logic for "half-off" - but really that's because the first two judgmental presentations were defining twice as many connectives as appeared to the naked eye. (As an aside, if you study classical linear logic, you're forced into the same conclusion for different reasons.)

Jason Reed taught me that, if you have two different judgments in a logic, it's worth seeing what happens if you syntactically differentiate the things you judge to be true and the things you judge to be false. Let's go ahead and "guess the right answer" - I'm going to call the things we judge to be true positive, and that the things we judge to be false negative. There's more than one of everything! \[ \begin{align} A^- = & \neg^- A^+ \mid P^- \mid A^- \wedge^- B^- \mid A^- \vee^- B^-\\ A^+ = & \neg^+ A^- \mid P^+ \mid A^+ \wedge^+ B^+ \mid A^+ \vee^+ B^+ \end{align} \] Here are a bunch of rules: note that the fact that the two negations change the polarity of the propositions; the rules make it evident that this is the right thing to do, because we have (for example) \(\neg^+ A^- ~\mathit{true}\) but \(A^- ~\mathit{false}\):

\[ \infer {\Psi, ~ \neg^- A^+~\mathit{false} \vdash \#} {\Psi, ~ A^+~\mathit{true} \vdash \#} \qquad \infer {\Psi, ~ \neg^+ A^-~\mathit{true} \vdash \#} {\Psi, ~ A^-~\mathit{false} \vdash \#} \] \[ \infer {\Psi, ~ A^- \wedge^- B^-~\mathit{false} \vdash \#} {\Psi, ~ A^-~\mathit{false} \vdash \# &\Psi, ~ B^-~\mathit{false} \vdash \#} \qquad \infer {\Psi, ~ A^+ \wedge^+ B^+~\mathit{true} \vdash \#} {\Psi, ~ A^+~\mathit{true}, ~ B^+~\mathit{true} \vdash \#} \] \[ \infer {\Psi, ~ A^- \vee^- B^-~\mathit{false} \vdash \#} {\Psi, ~ A^-~\mathit{false}, ~ B^-~\mathit{false} \vdash \#} \qquad \infer {\Psi, ~ A^+ \vee^+ B^+~\mathit{true} \vdash \#} {\Psi, ~ A^+~\mathit{true} \vdash \# &\Psi, ~ B^+~\mathit{true} \vdash \#} \]

So, are we good? Well, no, not really. The problem is that the "+" or "-" stuck to an atomic proposition isn't an annotation or modifier the way the overbar was in the one-sided, truth-oriented sequent calculus above. \(P^+\) and \(P^-\) are different atomic propositions, and it wouldn't be right to given an inference rule that had, as its conclusion, \(\Psi, ~ P^+~\mathit{true}, ~ P^-\mathit{false}\). Why? Well, for now let's go with "because I said so." The argument I have for this point isn't bulletproof, and it has to do with the role of atomic propositions as stand-ins for other propositions.

However, if you accept my argument from authority, we are left no way to prove, or even to state, anything equivalent to the classical \(P \vee \neg P\) into polarized logic, since any way we try to polarize this formula will lead to \(P\) needing to be both positive and negative. We're going to need some way, different from negation, of including positive propositions in negative ones.

These inclusions of positive propositions into negative ones (and vice versa) are called shifts - \({\downarrow}A^-\) is a positive proposition and \({\uparrow}A^+\) is a negative proposition. We could just add these two rules and call it a day... \[ \infer {\Psi, ~ P^+~\mathit{true}, ~ {\uparrow}P^+~\mathit{false} \vdash \#} {} \qquad \infer {\Psi, ~ P^-~\mathit{false}, ~ {\downarrow}P^-~\mathit{true} \vdash \#} {} \] ...but this is hardly general: the rules above should be derivable; this rule should be derivable as well: \[ \infer {\Psi, ~ P^+~\mathit{true}, ~{\uparrow}(P^+ \vee^+ Q^+)~\mathit{false} \vdash \#} {} \] All three of these derivable rules share a common property: in an on-paper proof, we would say that the contradiction is "trivial." The hypothesis \({\uparrow}P^+~\mathit{false}\) is trivial due to the fact that \(P^+\) is true by a different hypothesis, and because the truth of \(P^+\) allows us to trivially conclude that \(P^+ \vee^+ Q^+\) is true, \(P^+ \vee^+ Q^+\) is trivially contradictory as well.

This idea is encoded in two rules which capture proof-by-contradiction. One way we establish a contradiction is by showing that \(A^+\) is both false (by assumption) and trivial (by direct proof). The other way we establish a contradiction is by showing that \(A^-\) is both true (by assumption) and false (by direct proof of absurdity). These are embodied in the following two rules:

\[ \infer {\Psi \vdash \#} {{\uparrow}A^+~\mathit{false} \in \Psi &\Psi \vdash A^+~\mathit{trivial}} \qquad \infer {\Psi \vdash \#} {{\downarrow}A^-~\mathit{true} \in \Psi &\Psi \vdash A^-~\mathit{absurd}} \]

Now, of course, we need to give a bunch more rules to describe how to prove positive propositions trivial and negative propositions absurd.

\[ \infer {\Psi, ~ P^+~\mathit{true} \vdash P^+~\mathit{trivial}} {} \qquad \infer {\Psi, ~ P^-~\mathit{false} \vdash P^-~\mathit{absurd}} {} \] \[ \infer {\Psi \vdash \neg^+ A^-~\mathit{trivial}} {\Psi \vdash A^-~\mathit{absurd}} \qquad \infer {\Psi \vdash \neg^- A^+~\mathit{absurd}} {\Psi \vdash A^+~\mathit{trivial}} \] \[ \infer {\Psi \vdash A^+ \wedge^+ B^+~\mathit{trivial}} {\Psi \vdash A^+~\mathit{trivial} &\Psi \vdash B^+~\mathit{trivial}} \qquad \infer {\Psi \vdash A^+ \vee^+ B^+~\mathit{trivial}} {\Psi \vdash A^+~\mathit{trivial}} \qquad \infer {\Psi \vdash A^+ \vee^+ B^+~\mathit{trivial}} {\Psi \vdash B^+~\mathit{trivial}} \] \[ \infer {\Psi \vdash A^- \wedge^- B^-~\mathit{absurd}} {\Psi \vdash A^-~\mathit{absurd}} \qquad \infer {\Psi \vdash A^- \wedge^- B^-~\mathit{absurd}} {\Psi \vdash B^-~\mathit{absurd}} \qquad \infer {\Psi \vdash A^- \vee^- B^-~\mathit{absurd}} {\Psi \vdash A^-~\mathit{absurd} &\Psi \vdash B^-~\mathit{absurd}} \]

Even yet, we are not done! We need to deal with the shifts, which embody another form of proof-by-contradiction: to prove that \(A^-\) holds trivially, assume it's false and derive a contradiction.

\[ \infer {\Psi \vdash {\downarrow}A^-~\mathit{trivial}} {\Psi, A^-~\mathit{false} \vdash \#} \qquad \infer {\Psi \vdash {\uparrow}A^+~\mathit{absurd}} {\Psi, A^+~\mathit{true} \vdash \#} \]

The thing that we've come up with by this process is what I've been calling a "weakly focused" version of classical logic. If we wanted to turn it into a "fully focused" presentation of classical logic, we'd only need to make one change: the first "proof by contradiction" rules, which we call "focusing" rules, would need to require that the context \(\Psi\) includes only judgments of the form \(P^+~\mathit{true}\), \({\downarrow}A^-~\mathit{true}\), \(P^-~\mathit{false}\), and \({\uparrow}A^+~\mathit{false}\). A context including only judgments of these four forms is called stable. To get full focusing, we would modify the "trivial focus" rule like this (a similar modification would be made to the "absurd focus" rule):

\[ \infer {\Psi \vdash \#} {{\uparrow}A^+~\mathit{false} \in \Psi &\Psi \vdash A^+~\mathit{trivial} &\Psi~\mathit{stable}} \]

Thinking about the sequent calculus as a bottom-up proof search procedure, if we are looking for a proof of a non-stable sequent, we can use our original, invertible rules to break down the connectives in the contexts until we have only stable sequents, at which point we can apply a focusing rule.

Until next time...

I haven't quite had time to do the thing I originally set out to do, which was to work through the notation in "Polarity and the logic of delimited continuations" better. But I will save that for another time. The motivation is the same as the one from before: it seems like we're almost certainly duplicating work. Is it possible to give the presentation of polarized classical logic from the previous section using about half as many rules?

Saturday, November 12, 2011

Another take on polarized natural deduction

This has been sitting on my office whiteboard for a few days, where it doesn't do anybody (well, except for me and my officemates) any good. It's a canonical-forms presentation of natural deduction for polarized logic that corresponds to the focused sequent calculus I presented and analyzed in the (recently-updated) Structural focalization draft (PDF warning). The polarized sequent calculus in that draft isn't new: it's a tweaked version of Liang and Miller's authoritative LJF.1 This canonical-forms presentation, however, is not something I've seen, so I'd be interested to know if it's been seen elsewhere: I know this is an area where a lot of other people have been working.

A bidirectional type system for polarized logic

There is, in my mind at least, no argument about what the propositions of polarized intuitionstic logic are; the following is straight of the aforementioned draft, but the basic idea dates back to Girard's 1991 post to the LINEAR mailing list, creatively titled "On the sex of angles".

\( {\bf Positive~propositions:} ~~ A^+, B^+, C^+ ~~ ::= ~~ p^+ \mid {\downarrow}A^- \mid \bot \mid A^+ \vee B^+ \mid \top^+ \mid A^+ \wedge^+ B^+ \)
\( {\bf Negative~propositions:} ~~ A^-, B^-, C^- ~~ ::= ~~ p^- \mid {\uparrow}A^+ \mid A^+ \supset B^- \mid \top^- \mid A^- \wedge^- B^- \)

What makes a proposition positive or negative? Good question! I won't address it here. (I address it a bit in the draft.)

Following tradition and best practices, we will structure the canonical forms presentation as a bidirectional type system. There are three judgments to worry about, as compared to the two judgments in other canonical forms presentations of logic. These judgments include contexts \(\Gamma\), which are sets of negative variables \(x\) associated with negative propositions (\(x{:}A^-\)) and positive variables \(z\) associated with atomic positive propositions (\(z{:}p^+\)).

  • \( \Gamma \vdash R \Rightarrow A^- \) - this is the familiar synthesis judgment from canonical forms presentations; it expresses that the atomic term \(R\) synthesizes \(A^-\). The word "synthesis" is used because it is possible to think of the type \(A^-\) as an output to the judgment, whereas \(\Gamma\) and \(R\) are inputs. In the other two judgments, everything will be treated as an input.

    \( R ::= x \mid R~V \mid \pi_1 R \mid \pi_2 R \)

  • \( \Gamma \vdash V \Leftarrow A^+ \) - this is the new judgment corresponding to right focus in the focused sequent calculus; we say that the value \(V\) checks against \(A^+\).

    \( V ::= z \mid N \mid {\sf inl}~V \mid {\sf inr}~V \mid \langle\rangle^+ \)

  • \( \Gamma \vdash N \Leftarrow [\Omega] A^-\) - this is a modification of the familiar checking judgment from canonical forms presentations, which usually lack the bit about \([\Omega]\), which is an ordered list of positive propositions. The reason we need \([\Omega]\) is precisely because we're dealing with positive propositions, which most canonical forms presentations lack or deal with in an unsatisfactory (in my humble opinion) manner. (I'll return to this point in the discussion at the end.)We say that thus judgment expresses that the normal term \(N\) decomposes \(\Omega\) and verifies \(A^-\).

    \( N ::= R \mid z.N \mid V \mid {\sf let}~R~{\sf in}~N \mid x.N \mid \lambda N \mid \langle\rangle^- \mid \langle N_1, N_2 \rangle^- \mid {\sf abort} \mid [ N_1, N_2 ]\)

Except for the first four rules, everything is patterned in the usual style of presentation for a natural deduction system: for each connective, we give first the introduction rules and then the elimination rules.

Hypothesis and atomic propositions

\[ \infer {\Gamma \vdash R \Leftarrow []p^-} {\Gamma \vdash R \Rightarrow p'^- & p^- = p'^-} \qquad \infer {\Gamma \vdash x \Rightarrow A^-} {x{:}A^- \in \Gamma} \qquad \infer {\Gamma \vdash z \Leftarrow p^+} {z{:}p^+ \in \Gamma} \qquad \infer {\Gamma \vdash z.N \Leftarrow [p^+, \Omega] C^-} {\Gamma, z{:}p&+ \vdash N \Leftarrow [\Omega] C^-} \]

Shifts

\[ \infer {{\uparrow}A^+~{\it stable}} {} \qquad \infer {p^-~{\it stable}} {} \] \[ \infer {\Gamma \vdash V \Leftarrow []{\uparrow}A^+} {\Gamma \vdash V \Leftarrow A^+} \qquad \infer {\Gamma \vdash {\sf let}~R~{\sf in}~N \Leftarrow []C^-} {\Gamma \vdash R \Rightarrow {\uparrow}A^+ & \Gamma \vdash N \Leftarrow [A^+]C^- & C^-~{\it stable}} \] \[ \infer {\Gamma \vdash N \Leftarrow {\downarrow}A^-} {\Gamma \vdash N \Leftarrow []A^-} \qquad \infer {\Gamma \vdash x.N \Leftarrow [{\downarrow}A^-, \Omega]C^-} {\Gamma, x{:}A^- \vdash N \Leftarrow [\Omega]C^-} \]

Connectives

\[ \infer {\Gamma \vdash \lambda N \Leftarrow []A^+ \supset B^-} {\Gamma \vdash N \Leftarrow [A^+]B^-} \qquad \infer {\Gamma \vdash R~V \Rightarrow B^-} {\Gamma \vdash R \Rightarrow A^+ \supset B^- & \Gamma \vdash V \Leftarrow A^+} \] \[ \infer {\Gamma \vdash \langle\rangle^- \Leftarrow \top^-} {} \qquad {\it (no~elim~rule~for~\top^-)} \] \[ \infer {\Gamma \vdash \langle N_1, N_2 \rangle^- \Leftarrow A^- \wedge^- B^-} {\Gamma \vdash N_1 \Leftarrow A^- & \Gamma \vdash N_2 \Leftarrow B^-} \qquad \infer {\Gamma \vdash \pi_1 R \Rightarrow A^-} {\Gamma \vdash R \Rightarrow A^- \wedge^- B^-} \qquad \infer {\Gamma \vdash \pi_2 R \Rightarrow B^-} {\Gamma \vdash R \Rightarrow A^- \wedge^- B^-} \] \[ {\it (no~intro~rule~for~\bot)} \qquad \infer {\Gamma \vdash {\sf abort} \Leftarrow [\bot, \Omega]C^-} {} \] \[ \infer {\Gamma \vdash {\sf inl}~V \Leftarrow A^+ \vee B^+} {\Gamma \vdash V \Leftarrow A^+} \qquad \infer {\Gamma \vdash {\sf inr}~V \Leftarrow A^+ \vee B^+} {\Gamma \vdash V \Leftarrow B^+} \qquad \infer {\Gamma \vdash [N_1, N_2] \Leftarrow [A^+ \vee B^+, \Omega] C^-} {\Gamma \vdash N_1 \Leftarrow [A^+, \Omega] C^- & \Gamma \vdash N_2 \Leftarrow [B^+, \Omega] C^-} \] \[ \infer {\Gamma \vdash \langle\rangle^+ \Leftarrow \top^+} {} \qquad \infer {\Gamma \vdash \langle\rangle.N \Leftarrow [\top^+, \Omega] C^-} {\Gamma \vdash N \Leftarrow [\Omega] C^-} \] \[ \infer {\Gamma \vdash \langle V_1^+, V_2^+ \rangle \Leftarrow A^+ \wedge^+ B^+} {\Gamma \vdash V_1^+ \Leftarrow A^+ & \Gamma \vdash V_2^+ \Leftarrow B^+} \qquad \infer {\Gamma \vdash N \Leftarrow [A^+ \wedge^+ B^+, \Omega] C^-} {\Gamma \vdash N \Leftarrow [A^+, B^+, \Omega] C^-} \]

Discussion

There are two possible questions I want to address about this system in the previous section.

What's with those positive "elimination" rules?

It would be possible to complain that the system above is not very "natural deduction-ey" after all - for all the positive connectives, I basically give sequent calculus left rules instead of natural deduction elimination rules. What happened to the usual "large elimination"-style elimination rules, for instance the usual disjunction-elimination rule whose proof term is a case analysis? \[ \infer {\Gamma \vdash ({\sf case}~R~{\sf of}~{\sf inl}~x \rightarrow N_1 \mid {\sf inr}~y \rightarrow N_2) \Leftarrow C} {\Gamma \vdash R \Rightarrow A \wedge B & \Gamma, x{:}A \vdash N_1 \Leftarrow C & \Gamma, y{:}B \vdash N_2 \Leftarrow C} \]

I think that the answer can be given by looking at the shifts. Essentially, every large elimination as we know and love it follows from the structure of the \({\uparrow}\) elimination rule, which all on its own looks an awful lot like a cut. You should verify for yourself that, if you let \({\sf case}~R~{\sf of}~{\sf inl}~x \Rightarrow N_1 \mid {\sf inr}~y \Rightarrow N_2\) be defined as syntactic sugar for \({\sf let}~R~{\sf in}~[ x.N_1, y.N_2]\), then the following rule is derivable whenever \(C^-~{\it stable}\) holds.2 \[ \infer {\Gamma \vdash {\sf case}~R~{\sf of}~{\sf inl}~x \Rightarrow N_1 \mid {\sf inr}~y \Rightarrow N_2 \Leftarrow C^-} {\Gamma \vdash R \Rightarrow {\uparrow}({\downarrow}A^- \vee {\downarrow}B^-) & \Gamma, x{:}A^- \vdash N_1 \Leftarrow C^- & \Gamma, y{:}B^- \vdash N_2 \Leftarrow C^-} \]

Pay attention to those two appearances of the downshift \({\downarrow}\) - they tell you something important about the structure of the usual elimination rules, which is that they "lose focus" while decomposing the disjunction. The usual way of thinking of normal natural deduction doesn't require, when you decompose \(A \vee B\) in an elimination, that you continue decomposing \(A\) and \(B\), which is represented here by the fact that, to match the structure of the usual elimination rule, you have to put downshifts \in explicitly. Jacob Howe, in his thesis and in his excellent paper "Proof search in lax logic," demonstrates this by making a focused sequent calculus that corresponds to the usual (constantly-interrupted) notion of decomposing positive propositions that you get if you follow your intuitions from natural deduction too closely.

By gathering all the large eliminations together in the \({\uparrow}\) elimination rule, we allow for the usual large eliminations to be defined, but also allow for the possibility that we might want to "chain" large eliminations in a well-defined way. (As an exercise, consider the structure of the elimination rule for \({\uparrow}(({\downarrow}A^- \wedge^+ {\downarrow}B^-) \vee (p^+ \wedge^+ \top^+))\).) This is why I claim that this is a natural deduction system that corresponds to the focused sequent calculus, instead of Howe's system where it's the other way around.3

Where are all the patterns?

Patterns have been associated with focused and/or canonical forms presentations of logic ever since... well, since Neel wrote the paper "Focusing on pattern matching"... or maybe since Noam wrote "Focusing and higher-order abstract syntax"... well, really at least since the CLF tech report. A lot of these, notably Noam's systems, have presented the rules of logic using pattern judgments, devices which abstractly represent the way in which values of a particular (positive) type are constructed or the way atomic terms of a particular (negative) type are eliminated.

There's this picture that isn't fully formed in my head, but that I've been thinking about for some time. On the left side of this picture, I think, you have the (pattern-free) presentation of natural deduction that I have given here at the top, and the (pattern-free) focused sequent calculus from "Structural focalization" at the bottom. Then, in the middle, you have (at the top) a natural deduction system that uses Noam's pattern judgments to introduce negative propositions and eliminate positive propositions - this is precisely (or at least very nearly) Taus Brock-Nannestad and Carsten Schürmann's system from "Focused Natural Deduction." Below it, there is a sequent calculus system that uses Noam's pattern judgments to eliminate negative propositions and introduce positive propositions. Kevin Watkins and Frank Pfenning came up with this idea and named it the "skeleton calculus" (a reference to the "spine calculus" of Cervesato and Pfenning), but it hasn't been written up that I know of. The skeleton calculus was what I was thinking about this morning when I decided to write this post. Then, on the far right, you have Noam's system, which is entirely pattern-based: patterns are used to both introduce and eliminate all connectives, so that the logic itself basically doesn't "know" about any connectives at all. This hazy picture is why, in the structural focalization draft, I mentioned that I thought Noam's system was a "natural synthesis of natural deduction and sequent calculus presentations".

But why should the picture look like the one I sketched above? Why not have a natural deduction system that uses patterns to introduce positives and eliminate negatives, or a sequent calculus that uses patterns to eliminate positives and introduce negatives? There's also the elephant in the room: CLF, which has both natural deduction and sequent calculus presentations, but which, in both instances, uses patterns only in the elimination of positive connectives. What are all these options doing here, and what are we to make of them? I don't know (yet).


1 I should add that, while the adaptation of LJF isn't particularly interesting, the proof term assignment I give is different than any others I've seen and I'm pretty happy with it; that's another case where I'd be interested to know if others have done anything similar.
2 This additional requirement of stability just reflects that it's always possible to restrict large eliminations in a canonical forms presentation of natural deduction to situations where the; this isn't always required in canonical forms presentations of natural deduction, but is an important part of making sure the sequent calculus presented in "Structural focalization" corresponds correctly to the natural deduction presentation.
3 I specifically suspect that this is a natural deduction system isomorphic to the focused sequent calculus from Structural focalization, but I don't want to make that claim until I've proved it.

Monday, September 20, 2010

Natural deduction and sequent calculus - united in a polarized linear framework

In the last post I talked a little bit about what it means to give atomic propositions in a logical framework polarity. The main point I wanted to get around to was that if we have a proposition in the signature of the form P1+ ⊃ P2+ ⊃ P3+, then all the information contained in that rule is captured by this synthetic inference rule:
  Γ, P1+, P2+, P3+ ⊢ Q
-------------------
Γ, P1+, P2+ ⊢ Q
On the other hand, if I have a proposition in the signature of the form P1- ⊃ P2- ⊃ P3-, then all the information contained in that rule is captured by this synthetic inference rule:
  Γ ⊢ P1-
Γ ⊢ P2-
--------
Γ ⊢ P3-
By further mixing-and-matching the polarities of atomic propositions, we can get a whole host of synthetic inference rules.

First, a clarification

Before I get started with this post, I want to point out that in the last post I said something imprecise: that the strongest possible form of adequacy is to say that the synthetic inference rules induced by your signature have an exact correspondence with the "on-paper" inference rules. I then gave an example, saying that
  ∨L : (hyp A → conc C)
→ (hyp B → conc C)
→ (hyp (A ∨ B) → conc C)
corresponds to this expected synthetic inference rule
  Γ, hyp (A ∨ B), hyp A ⊢ conc C
Γ, hyp (A ∨ B), hyp B ⊢ conc C
-------------------------------- ∨L
Γ, hyp (A ∨ B) ⊢ conc C
only if (hyp A) has positive polarity. But this isn't quite the right story, because from the definition of ∨L we know nothing about the contents of Γ, and our notion of adequacy with respect to the sequent calculus requires that our judgments take the form Γ ⊢ conc C where Γ contains only atomic propositions hyp A for some propositions A. So, really, this strongest possible notion of adequacy needs one additional puzzle piece, a generalization of what the Twelfers would call regular worlds. We can assume the conclusion of the derived rule is in the image of some "on paper" judgment, but we also need to verify that the premises will always end up similarly in the image of some "on paper" judgment.

Now, with that out of the way...

Representing natural deduction in LLF

The post today starts off working with a subset of the Linear Logical Framework (LLF) designed (in large part) by Cervesato. We can reason about specifications in this framework using Jason Reed's HLF/Twelf implementation. Essentially, we will be using this framework the same way we used it last week: defining a signature and looking at the synthetic inference rules that arise from that signature.

It has recently become common to see presentations of the canonical forms of a simply-typed lambda calculus presented in spine form; doing so removes a major source of unplesentless in the proof of global soundness/hereditary substitution. You do have to pay the piper, though: it is more difficult to handle the proof of global completeness/η-expansion in a spine form calculus. However, a Twelf proof that Frank Pfenning worked out in February '09, which uses something like a third-order premise, can successfully handle the proof of global completeness for a spine-form presentation of canonical forms. One version of this Twelf proof, which can be found here, is presented as a bunch of Twelf code without much commentary, and the current story arose in part due to my attempts to provide some commentary and intuition for this Twelf proof of eta expansion and generalize it to substructural logics.

In the process, I ended up investigating another way of presenting logic that is somewhere between a natural deduction and spine form presentation. A bit of Twelf code describing this presentation can be found here, but the key point is that, when we need to verify an atomic proposition Q, we pick some hypothesis A from the context and show that, from a use of A we can prove that Q can be used. This is basically what happens in spine form, but here the "spiney" things associate the opposite of the way they do in spine form presentations. It looks something like this:
  end : use A A.
atm : hyp A -> use A (a Q) -> verif (a Q).
⊃I : (hyp A -> verif B) -> verif (A ⊃ B).
⊃E : use A (B1 ⊃ B2) -> verif B1 -> use A B2.
One thing that we've known for a long time is that the atomic proposition (use A B) is an instance of a pattern - it can be thought of as a Twelf representation of the linear funtion use A -o use B, in which case the rule end above is just the identity function λx.x.

But, since we're putting ourself conceptually in the territory of LLF, not the territory of LF/Twelf, we can represent the thing that is morally a linear function as an actual linear function. The main trick is appropriately using unrestricted implication -> versus linear implication -o in such a way that it controls the branch of the subproof that the linear assumption use B winds up in. The resulting signature looks much like a standard natural deduction presentation with a very non-standard transition between uses and verifications (the usual rule is just use (a Q) -> verif (a Q)) and a sprinkling of lollipops where we'd normally see arrows.
  atm : hyp A -> (use A -o use (a Q)) -> verif (a Q).
⊃I : (hyp A1 -> verif A2) -> verif (A1 ⊃ A2).
⊃E : use (A1 ⊃ A2) -o verif A1 -> use A2.
∧I : verif A1 -> verif A2 -> verif (A1 ∧ A2).
∧E1 : use (A1 ∧ A2) -o use A1.
∧E2 : use (A1 ∧ A2) -o use A2.
We are interested, for the purpose of this presentation, in hypothetical judgments of the form (Γ; · ⊢ hyp A), (Γ; · ⊢ verif A), and (Γ; use A ⊢ use B), where Γ contains unrestricted facts of the form hyp A. In light of this, we can show the synthetic inference rules that result from the above signature.
  ---------------------------- hyp
Γ, hyp A; · ⊢ hyp A

---------------------------- use
Γ; use A ⊢ use A

Γ; · ⊢ hyp A
Γ; use A ⊢ use (a Q)
---------------------------- atm
Γ; · ⊢ verif (a Q)

Γ, hyp A1; · ⊢ verif A2
---------------------------- ⊃I
Γ; · ⊢ verif (A1 ⊃ A2)

Γ; use B ⊢ use (A1 ⊃ A2)
Γ; · ⊢ verif A1
---------------------------- ⊃E
Γ; use B ⊢ use A2

Γ; · ⊢ verif A1
Γ; · ⊢ verif A2
---------------------------- ∧I
Γ; · ⊢ verif (A1 ∧ A2)

Γ; use B ⊢ use (A1 ∧ A2)
---------------------------- ∧E1
Γ; use B ⊢ use A1

Γ; use B ⊢ use (A1 ∧ A2)
---------------------------- ∧E2
Γ; use B ⊢ use A2
There are basically no surprises - the complete HLF/Twelf specification, including global soundness and completeness proofs, is essentially just a repeat of the most closely related related Twelf specification where the elimination rules in the signature look somewhat less unusual.

Switching up the polarity

Now, let us imagine that we add atoms with positive polarity to LLF in a way analagous to their addition in the previous post. Obviously (hyp A) is naturally positive, so we can make that change, but that is not the interesting point. Consider the derived rules if we *also* make (use A) positive and restrict our attention to sequents of the form (Γ; · ⊢ verif A) and (Γ; use A ⊢ use (a Q)).
  ---------------------------- use
Γ; use (a Q) ⊢ use (a Q)

Γ, hyp A; use A ⊢ use (a Q)
---------------------------- atm
Γ, hyp A; · ⊢ verif (a Q)

Γ, hyp A1; · ⊢ verif A2
---------------------------- ⊃I
Γ; · ⊢ verif (A1 ⊃ A2)

Γ; use A₂ ⊢ use (a Q)
Γ; · ⊢ verif A1
---------------------------- ⊃E
Γ; use (A₁ ⊃ A₂) ⊢ use (a Q)

Γ; · ⊢ verif A1
Γ; · ⊢ verif A2
---------------------------- ∧I
Γ; · ⊢ (verif A1 ∧ verif A2)

Γ; use A1 ⊢ use (a Q)
---------------------------- ∧I1
Γ; use (A1 ∧ A1) ⊢ use (a Q)

Γ; use A2 ⊢ use (a Q)
---------------------------- ∧I2
Γ; use (A1 ∧ A1) ⊢ use (a Q)
While our previous formalizaiton was an interesting sort-of modified version of natural deduction, the result when we change the polarity of the atomic proposition (use A) is precisely a focused sequent calculus.

A few related points

There are a lot of other neat explorations to consider in the near vicinity of this topic. Among them are:
  • Generalizing to a polarized, weakly-focused logic. I did most of this once, but there were some issues with my original proof.
  • What's the precise natural deduction system that the system with weak focusing + inversion on negative propositions corresponds to? Does it correspond exactly to the style of natural deduction used by Howe in "Proof Search in Lax Logic"?
  • Generalizing to a fully-focused logic (how close can we get, for instance, to the natural deduction system of Brock-Nannestad and Schürmann ("Focused Natural Deduction," LPAR 2010)?
  • Can this generalize to a focused linear sequent calculus, or do I only get to use linearity once per specification? Could the machinery of HLF be used to work around that?
  • The global soundness and completeness results that I established in HLF have the least amount of slickness possible - I basically just repeat the proof that I gave for the Twelf formalization without linearity. How close can we get to the intuition that the eta expansion theorem says use A -> verif A for all A?

Friday, September 17, 2010

Focusing and synthetic rules

So, I was trying to explain to some people at a whiteboard something that I thought was more generally obvious than I guess it is. So, post! This post assumes you have seen lots of sequent caculi and have maybe have heard of focusing before, but I'll review the focusing basics first. And here's the main idea: focusing lets you treat propositions as rules. This is not an especially new idea if you are "A Twelf Person," but the details are still a bit pecular.

Let's start with a little baby logical framework. Here are the types:
  A ::= A → A | P⁺ | P⁻
Those P⁺ and P⁻ are the atomic propositions, and there can be as many of them as we want for there to be.

Focusing, real quick

There are three judgments that we need to be worried about. Γ ⊢ [ A ] is the right focus judgment, Γ[ A ] ⊢ Q is the left focus judgment, and Γ ⊢ A is the out-of-focus judgment.

Okay. So focusing (any sequent caclulus presentation of logic, really) encourages you to read rules from the bottom to the top, and that's how the informal descriptions will work. The first set of rules deal with right-focus, where you have to prove A right now. If you are focused on a positive atomic proposition, it has to be available right now as one of the things in the context. Otherwise (if you are focused on a negative atomic proposition or A → B), just try to prove it regular-style.
  P⁺ ∈ Γ
-----------
Γ ⊢ [ P⁺ ]

Γ ⊢ P⁻
----------
Γ ⊢ [ P⁻ ]

Γ ⊢ A → B
-------------
Γ ⊢ [ A → B ]
The second set of rules deal with left-focus. One pecular bit: we write left focus as Γ[ A ] ⊢ Q, and by Q we mean either a positive atomic proposition P⁺ or a negative atomic proposition P⁻. If we're in left focus on the positive atom, then we stop focusing and just add P⁺ to the set of antecedents Γ, but if we're in left focus on a negative atomic proposition P⁻, then we must to be trying to prove P⁻ on the right right now in order for the proof to succeed. Then, finally, if we're left focused on A → B, then we have to prove A in right focus and B in left focus.
  Γ, P⁺ ⊢ Q
------------
Γ[ P⁺ ] ⊢ Q

-------------
Γ[ P⁻ ] ⊢ P⁻

Γ ⊢ [ A ]
Γ[ B ] ⊢ Q
---------------
Γ[ A → B ] ⊢ Q
Finally, we need rules that deal with out-of-focus sequents. If we have an out-of-focus sequent and we're trying to prove P⁺, then we can go ahead and finish if P⁺ is already in the context. There is no rule for directly proving A⁻, but if we have a positive or negative atomic proposition that we're trying to prove, we can left-focus and work from there. And if we're trying to prove A → B, we can assume A and keep on trying to prove B.
  P⁺ ∈ Γ
-------
Γ ⊢ P⁺

A ∈ Γ
A is not a positive atomic proposition
Γ[ A ] ⊢ Q
---------------------------------------
Γ ⊢ Q

Γ, A ⊢ B
-----------
Γ ⊢ A → B
There are a lot of different similar presentations of focusing, most of which amount to the same thing, and most of which take some shortchuts. This one is no different, but the point is that this system is "good enough" that it lets us talk about the two big points.

The first big point about focusing is that it's complete - any sequent caclulus or natural deduction proof system for intuitionstic logic will prove exactly the same things as the focused sequent calculus. Of course, the "any other sequent calculus" you picked probably won't have a notion of positive and negative atomic propositions. That's the second big point: atomic propositions can be assigned as either positive or negative, but a given atomic proposition has to always be assigned the same positive-or-negativeness (that positive-or-negativeness is called polarity, btw). And on a similar note, you can change an atomic proposition's polarity if you change it everywhere. This may radically change the structure of a proof, but the same things will definitely be provable. Both of these things, incidentally, were noticed by Andreoli.

Synthetic inference rules

An idea that was also noticed by Andreoli but that was really developed by Kaustuv Chaudhuri is the idea that, when talking about a focused system, we should really think about proofs as being made up of synthetic inference rules, which are an artifact of focusing. The particular case of unfocused sequents where the conclusion is an atomic proposition, Γ ⊢ Q, is a special case that we can call neutral sequents. The only way we can prove a neutral sequent is to pull something out of the context and either finish (if the thing in the context is the positive atomic proposition we want to prove) or go into left focus. For instance, say that it is the case that P⁻ → Q⁻ → R⁻ ∈ Γ. Then the following derivation consists only of choices that we had to make if we left-focus on that proposition.
          ...
Γ⊢Q⁻
... ------ ---------
Γ⊢P⁻ Γ⊢[Q⁻] Γ[R⁻]⊢R⁻
------ ----------------
Γ⊢[P⁻] Γ[Q⁻→R⁻]⊢R⁻
------------------
Γ[P⁻→Q⁻→R⁻]⊢R⁻ P⁻ → Q⁻ → R⁻ ∈ Γ
------------------------------------
Γ⊢R⁻
This is a proof that has two leaves which are neutral sequents and a conclusion which is a neutral sequent, and where all the choices (including the choice of what the conclusion was) were totally forced by the rules of focusing. Therefore, we can cut out all the middle steps (which are totally determined anyway) and say that we have this synthetic inference rule:
  P⁻ → Q⁻ → R⁻ ∈ Γ
Γ ⊢ Q⁻
Γ ⊢ P⁻
-----------------
Γ ⊢ R⁻
This synthetic inference rule is more compact and somewhat clearer than the rule with all the intermediate focusing steps. As a side note, proof search with the inverse method is often much faster, too, if we think about these synthetic inference rules instead of the regular rules: that's part of the topic of Kaustuv Chaudhuri and Sean McLaughlin's Ph.D. theses. Chaudhri calls these things "derived rules" in his Ph.D. thesis, but I believe he is also the originator of the terms "synthetic connective" and "synthetic inference rule."

Let's do a few more examples. First, let's look at a synthetic inference rule for a proposition that has positive atomic propositions in its premises:
           Q⁺∈Γ
... ------ ---------
Γ⊢P⁻ Γ⊢[Q⁺] Γ[R⁻]⊢R⁻
------ ----------------
Γ⊢[P⁻] Γ[Q⁺→R⁻]⊢R⁻
------------------
Γ[P⁻→Q⁺→R⁻]⊢R⁻ P⁻ → Q⁺ → R⁻ ∈ Γ
------------------------------------
Γ⊢R⁻
By convention, when one of the premises is of the form Q⁺ ∈ Γ, we go ahead and write the premise Q⁺ into the context everywhere, so the synthetic inference rule for this proposition is:
  P⁻ → Q⁺ → R⁻ ∈ Γ
Γ, Q⁺ ⊢ P⁻
-----------------
Γ, Q⁺ ⊢ R⁻
If the conclusion ("head") of the proposition is a positive atom instead of a negative one, then we end up with an arbitrary conclusion.
  ...      ....
Γ⊢P⁻ Γ,Q⁺⊢S
------ -------
Γ⊢[P⁻] Γ[Q⁺]⊢S
----------------
Γ[P⁻→Q⁺]⊢S P⁻ → Q⁺ ∈ Γ
---------------------------------------
Γ⊢R
The synthetic inference rule looks like this, where S is required to be an atomic proposition, but it can be either positive or negative:
  P⁻ → Q⁺ ∈ Γ
Γ ⊢ P⁻
Γ, Q⁺ ⊢ S
----------
Γ ⊢ S
If we have a higher-order premise (that is, an arrow nested to the left of an arrow - (P⁻ → Q⁺) → R⁻ is one such proposition), then we gain new assumptions in some of the branches of the proof. Note that the basic "shape" of this rule would not be affected if we gave P⁻ or Q⁺ the opposite polarity - synthetic inference rules are a little less sensitive to the polarity of atoms within higher-order premises.
   ...  
Γ,P⁻⊢Q⁺
-------
Γ⊢P⁻→Q⁺
--------- ---------
Γ⊢[P⁻→Q⁺] Γ[R⁻]⊢R⁻
--------------------
Γ[(P⁻→Q⁻)→R⁻]⊢R⁻ (P⁻ → Q⁺) → R⁻ ∈ Γ
---------------------------------------
Γ⊢R⁻
The synthetic inference rule, one more time, looks like this:
  (P⁻ → Q⁺) → R⁻ ∈ Γ
Γ, P⁻ ⊢ Q⁺
----------
Γ ⊢ R⁻

Application to logical frameworks

One annoyance in all of these derived rules is that each of them had a premise like (P⁻ → Q⁺) → R⁻ ∈ Γ. However, in a logical framework, we usually define a number of propositions in some "signature" Σ, and consider these propositions to be always true. Therefore, given any finite signature, we can "compile" that signature into a finite set of synthetic inference rules, add those to our logic, and throw away the signature - we don't need it anymore, as the synthetic inference rules contain precisely the logical information that was contained in the signature. Hence the motto, which admittedly may need some work: focusing lets you treat propositions as rules.

This is a strategy that hasn't been explored too much in logics where atomic propositions have mixed polarity - Jason Reed and Frank Pfenning's constructive resource semantics papers are the only real line of work that I'm familiar with, though Vivek's comment reminds me that I learned about the idea by way of Jason from Vivek and Dale Miller's paper "A framework for proof systems," section 2.3 in particular. (They in turn got it from something Girard wrote in French, I believe. Really gotta learn French one of these days.) The big idea here is that this is expressing the strongest possible form of adequacy - the synthetic inference rules that your signature gives rise to have an exact correspondance to the original, "on-paper" inference rules.

If this is our basic notion of adequacy, then I claim that everyone who has ever formalized the sequent calculus in Twelf has actually wanted positive atomic propositions. Quick, what's the synthetic connective corresponding to this pseudo-Twelf declaration of ∨L in the sequent calculus?
  ∨L : (hyp A → conc C)
→ (hyp B → conc C)
→ (hyp (A ∨ B) → conc C)
If you thought this:
  Γ, hyp (A ∨ B), hyp A ⊢ conc C
Γ, hyp (A ∨ B), hyp B ⊢ conc C
-------------------------------- ∨L
Γ, hyp (A ∨ B) ⊢ conc C
then what you wrote down corresponds to what we like to write in "on-paper" presentations of the intuitionstic sequent calculus, but it is not the correct answer. Twelf has only negative atomic propositions, so the correct answer is this:
  Γ ⊢ hyp (A ∨ B)
Γ, hyp A ⊢ conc C
Γ, hyp B ⊢ conc C
-------------------------------- ∨L
Γ ⊢ conc C
This is still adequate in the sense that complete on-paper sequent calculus proofs are in one-to-one correspondence with the complete LF proofs: the reason that is true is that, when I am trying to prove Γ ⊢ hyp (A ∨ B), by a global invariant of the sequent calculus I can only succeed by left-focusing on some hyp (A ∨ B) ∈ Γ and then immediately succeeding. However, the partial proofs that focusing and synthetic connectives give rise to are not in one-to-one correspondence.

In order to get the rule that we desire, of course, we need to think of hyp A as a positive atomic proposition (and conc C as negative). If we do that, then the first proposed synthetic inference rule is dead-on correct.

Poll

Hey, I'm kind of new at logicblogging and don't really know who is following me. This was really background for a post I want to write in the future. Background-wise, how was this post?

[Update Nov 11, 2010] Vivek's comments reminded me of the forgotten source for the "three levels of adequacy," Vivek and Dale's "A framework for proof systems," which is probably a more canonical source than Kaustuv's thesis for using these ideas for representation. Also, the tech report mentioned in Vivek's comment replays the whole story in intuitionistic logic and is very close to the development in this blog post.